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PUBLIC UTILITIES AND STATE REGULATION:
ALTERNATIVES FOR TREATMENT
OF THE INVESTMENT TAX CREDIT
Dean A. Calland*
In every major rate case, the administrative body that regulates a state's
utilities faces the same question: how to account for investment tax credit.
For example, in September, 1977, the California Public Utilities Commission
ordered Pacific, Telephone and Telegraph Company to reduce its utility rates
by $50 million and to refund $128.9 million to California consumers. 1 This
decree was the result of a decision by the commission not to allow Pacific
Telephone to include the credit on property investments it had earned for
income tax purposes in its rate-making formula. 2 Typically, state regulatory
bodies consider utility companies' federal income tax expense in determining
a fair rate of return to the shareholders of the utility industry. The commission
argued, however, that since the investment tax credit actually reduced Pacific's
federal income tax liability, consumer utility bills should reflect this decrease
in the utility's cost of providing telephone service. Pacific Telephone decried
this treatment of the investment credit. It asserted that Congress would not
have provided investment credit for utility companies if it could have foreseen
that state commissions would flow through the benefits to the ratepayer rather
than retain the revenues for the companies' use.
In the above case, and in every major rate case, the resolution of this
regulatory dilemma is of no small import. Since utility companies are by
nature capital-intensive, it can have a significant impact on consumers' monthly
utility bills. 3 These credits take on an even greater importance in light of the
accelerating demand and skyrocketing costs of all forms of energy production.
As the large utility companies' annual capital budgets continue to grow well
over a billion dollars, 4 the amount of investment tax credit naturally grows
proportionately. 5
This scenario presents a difficult situation for state regulatory bodies.
Clearly, their purpose is to keep utility rates at the lowest possible level
commensurate with a fair rate of return for the companies. Commissioners
must allow rates generous enough to make the utility industry profitable, but
at the same time they must keep a watchful eye on company-proposed additions
*B.A., Yale University, 1976; J.D. Candidate, University of Notre Dame Law School, 1979.
1.
2.
3.

4.
5.

Re Pacific Telephone and Telegraph Company, California Public Utilities Commission, No. 87838,
(1977). This case is currently pending before the California Supreme Court. Supreme Court S.F.
23743, 23745 and 23746.
The commission's order dealt with the similar question of the treatment of accelerated depreciation
tax benefits.
In fact, in a 1974 rate hearing involving Pacific Telephone, the commission indicated that the difference

for one year (1973) between a rate passing tax benefits on to the consumer and one permitting the
utilities to retain these benefits was approximately $23 million. Re Pacific Telephone & Telegraph
Company, California Public Utilities Commission, No. 83162, slip opinion at 71 (1974).
Pacific Telephone pointed out in testimony before the commission that its annual capital budget for
the year 1977 would be $1.35 billion.
An even greater impact is predicted for the future. The Carter administration's proposals for a 1978
revenue bill contemplate increasing the credit percentage to 12%.
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to the rate base.6 Each state commission has its own policy objectives which
are determined by a myriad of political, economic, and sociological factors.
The relative merits of these policy decisions have been argued at length
elsewhere and are beyond the scope of this note. The purpose of this note is
to present the available accounting alternatives to implement whichever policy
decisions are considered of greatest importance by the state regulatory
commissions. This presentation of accounting alternatives is necessary for state
regulatory decision-makers due to the lack of a binding judicial determination
of the appropriate accounting procedure for the investment tax credit (ITC).
While this area is ripe for litigation, no federal court has as yet decided the
issue. Until a final determination is made, each state must decide how it will
account for the ITC. In order to facilitate effective decision-making in this
area, the available alternatives must be evaluated in light of the relevant
federal statutes and current state administrative practices.
INVESTMENT TAX CREDIT-HISTORY
1. The Internal Revenue Code
The investment tax credit was first enacted in the Revenue Act of
1962. 7 This act provided regulated utilities with a 3% credit against federal
income tax for investment in certain depreciable property.8 The Revenue Act
of 1971 increased the credit to 4% for utility- companies and added a new
subsection (e) to Section 46 specifically dealing with regulated companies. 9 This
new subsection provided three options for all public utilities. Under the first
option, a utility could elect to have deferred ITC balances deducted from its
rate base as long as the rate base was restored not less rapidly than ratably
over the useful life of the asset. 10 This option also precluded any additional
reduction of the cost of service by any portion of the credit."
The second option provided for normalization and amortization of the
investment credit over the useful life of the property by credits to cost of
service, but did not allow the rate base to be reduced by any portion of
the deferred credit. This option is commonly referred to as "service life flow
through".12
The third option simply provided for an election whereby neither the first
nor second option would apply. This option, in effect, allowed a regulatory
body to treat the investment credit in any manner it deemed applicable (e.g.,
immediate flow through). 13 In the absence of any election by a utility, Option
1 was to apply to the credit.
The Tax Reduction Act of 1975 added a new subsection (f) retaining
6.
7.
8.

9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

Richard Morgan, Phantom Taxes in Your Electric Bill (1976) (Environmental Action Foundation of
the National Consumer Information Center). Mr. Morgan was a member of the Electric Utilities
Advisory Committee of the Federal Energy Administration.
The Revenue Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-834, 76 Stat. 960; I.R.C. §38.
For articles discussing the breadth of property eligible for the investment credit under the pertinent
code sections and rulings, see: Ron N. Bagley, "How to Maximize Investment Tax Credits: Planning
Under the Cases and Rulings," 43 J. Tax. 154 (1975), and James L. Finefrock, "Opportunities for
Increased Investment Credit Found in 1975 Transitional Rules,"45 J. Tax 168 (1975).
Revenue Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-178, 85 Stat. 497; I.R.C. §46-50.
The term "ratably" referred to in these rules is determined by using the period of time used in
computing depreciation expense for the purpose of reflecting operating results in the taxpayer's regulated
books of account. I.R.C. §167(l)(2)(c); S. Rep. No. 437, 92d Cong., IstSess. 38 (1971).
I.R.C. §46(e)(1), Revenue Act of 1971.
I.R.C. §46(e)(2), Revenue Act of 1971.
I.R.C. §46(e)(3), Revenue Act of 1971.
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word-for-word the provisions of the old subsection (e). 14 However, it raised
the investment credit from 4% to 10% of qualified investment in property
acquired and placed in service after January 21, 1975 and before January 1,
1977.15 It also added a new paragraph (8) under subsection (f).16 This
paragraph represents the most important difference between the 1971 act and
the 1975 act (other than the increase to 10%) for the purposes of state
regulatory bodies. Code §46(f)(8) provides procedures for making a new and
timely election under the 1975 act depending upon the company's previous
election (or lack thereof) under the 1971 act. Paragraph (8) provides: (a) that
in the absence of a prior Option 3 election under the 1971 act, a 1975 election
for Option 3 shall apply only to the 4% of investment credit that was provided
for under the 1971 act, and, (b) that a company which had made a timely
1971 election for Option 3 may elect to have Option 3 apply to the new 6%
credit. However, if a company does not make a new Option 3 election, then
Option I or Option 2 applies if either is specially applicable (e.g., by virtue
of a temporary regulation by the Secretary of the Treasury). 17 If neither
Option 1 nor Option 2 is applicable, Option 1 applies unless the company
elects Option 2 in the manner the Secretary prescribes. Clearly, Congress
intended to restrict the use of flow through accounting for the additional 6%
of investment tax credit in the absence of an election for continued flow
through by the company. In the case discussed supra, Pacific Telephone had
timely elected Option 2 treatment pursuant to §46(f)(2) of the Internal Revenue
Code. The commission, however, disregarded the election and proceeded to
apply Option 3 treatment to the company's investment credit.
2.

Legislative History
The legislative histories of the investment tax credit exhibit Congressional
desire to implement two major policy objectives: stimulating the national
economy and reducing the high unemployment rate. In addition, the 1971
report of the House Ways and Means Committee sets forth other policy
considerations that would be achieved as a result of successful implementation
of these objectives. These include relieving the hardship of inflation on lower
income groups, providing tax incentives to modernize our national productive
facilities, and increasing exports to improve the balance of payments. 18
Stimulation of the economy was without question the primary objective of
Congress in instituting the ITC in 1962 and re-enacting it in 1971. The utilities
contend that Congress intended to implement this objective by providing tax
credits that would increase cash flow and enable the industry to modernize
its facilities. This is true of utilities providing essential public services such as
water and telephone services and especially true of utilities engaged in the
14.
15.

16.
17.

18.

Tax Reduction Act of 1975, §301, Pub. L. No. 94-12, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (approved Mar. 29,
1975); I.R.C. §46 (1954), as amended.
Sec. 802(a) of the Tax Reform Act of 1976 extends the 10% credit for an additional four years to

apply generally to property placed in service before Jan. 1, 1981. This applies to all taxable years
beginning after Dec. 31, 1974.
Tax Reduction Act of 1975, I.R.C. §46(f)(8), added by §301(b)(3), Pub. L. No. 94-12, 94th Cong.,
1st Sess., (approved Mar. 29, 1975), effective under §301(b)(4) of the same act for taxable years
ending after Dec. 31, 1974.
Just such a situation confronted the West Virginia Public Service Commission in Re Huntington Water
Corporation, Case No. 8666, in which the company contended that the language of temporary Treasury
Reg. 9.1(b) precluded the necessity of an affirmative election in 1975 of Option 2, in order to be
treated as an Option 2 company under their 1971 election.
Donald Sturm, "Revenue Act of 1971, Class Life System, and I.T.C.", 30 N.Y.U. Tax Inst. at 1603.
Mr. Sturm discussed the report of the House Ways and Means Committee on Sept. 29, 1971.
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production and distribution of energy. Since this country is facing actual
shortages in almost all of our resources, the companies argue that it is of
critical importance that the tax benefits be retained by the companies. These
benefits would help update facilities which would in turn improve service. In
this regard, a 1975 Senate report expressed concern that
* , * the stimulation for the acquisition of productive facilities intended by
the increase in the investment tax credit with respect to public utility property
would be frustrated if any of the benefits were required to be flowed through
immediately to consumers in the form of lower rates. 19
Opponents of this view contend that the needs of the consuming public must
be carefully guarded. Though public utilities encounter substantial difficulties
in keeping their productive facilities modernized, the middle and lower class
consumer cannot withstand utility rate increases that are higher than absolutely
necessary. Utility bills will inevitably grow at a rapid rate as the law of supply
and demand continues to make prices soar. Higher production costs, continued
inflation and scarcity of resources will contribute to keeping utility bills at
the highest tolerable level. Consumer advocates assert, therefore, that public
capital requirements above that level should be weighed with the consumer's
interest of controlling significance. 20 They would, accordingly, be in full
agreement with the California Public Utilities Commission's decision in Pacific
Telephone to flow through the investment credit to the consumer.
The other major purpose of the investment credit legislation was reducing
the high rate of unemployment. In committee hearings, industry supporters
contended that increased expenditures by the utilities would place more money
in circulation and create work for those companies contracted to perform the
modernization, thereby creating more jobs. 2 1 Flow through advocates assert,
however, that there is a serious question whether modernization of equipment
is likely to be job-producing. In fact, a study conducted at Northwestern
University suggests that since these credits encourage investment in capital-intensive
rather than labor-intensive areas, they may have a negative effect on employment. 22 Whatever the merits of these arguments, it is apparent that the
legislative history does not settle the debate over the objectives of the investment
credit legislation.
The same situation exists regarding the actual accounting procedures in
ratemaking for regulated utilities. The wording of the Internal Revenue Code
and the legislative histories of the 1971 and 1975 acts make it clear that
Congress intended that the utilities retain the general benefit of the credit for
economic reasons. But the committee reports are not specific in requiring a
19. S. Rep. No. 36, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 44 (1975).
20. 3 General Tax Reform Panel Discussions, House Committee on Ways and Means, 93d Cong., 1st
Sess. (1975) (Statement of Robert Eisner). Consumer advocates also point out that the investment
credit does not apply to any form of intangible investment [I.R.C. §48(a)(1)]. This means that
investment in research and development, which many economists believe is a major factor in producing
growth, is left unrewarded. Thus, the companies invest large sums of money in facilities in order to
qualify for the credit. Consumer advocates charge that the credit for these expenditures will often
represent credit for modernizing facilities that would have been updated in any event, credit for
expenditures that could have been more productively spent, or credit for expenditures made by reason
of imprudent management decisions to modernize where it is not required. See: Robert Patinovich,
"Memorandum: In Regard to the Substitution of a Gross Usage Tax for Federal Income Tax Levied
Against Utilities" (April, 1977). Mr. Patinovich is president of the California Public Utilities Commission.
21. H.R. Rep. No. 19, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); S. Rep. No. 437, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); 1971
U.S. Cong. & Admin. News 1943.
22. Robert M. Coen, "Efficacy of the Investment Credit for Fiscal Purposes," 68 Proc. Nat1. Tax Assn.
- Tax Inst. Am. 33 (1976).
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particular accounting method. The Senate Finance Committee Report in 1971
is a good example. It provides in part:
To permit all the benefits of the credit to be flowed through to the consumer
currently could have an impact on revenues which is twice that applicable in
other cases. Moreover, the basic purpose of the investment credit is not an
allocation of resources which will stimulate consumption of any particular type
of product or service. For these reasons, as a general rule, the bill does not
make this credit available where all of the benefit from it would be flowed
through currently to the consumers . . .the credit is made available only
where there is assurance that some of the benefit at least will go to the
investors. 2 3
Though the companies found support in this wording, that same Senate report
went on to discuss the role of regulatory agencies:
Although there are many different ways of treating the credit for rate-making
purposes, the Committee, in general, believes that it is appropriate to permit
the regulatory agencies, where they conclude it is necessary, to divide the
benefits of the credit between the customers of the regulated industries and
the investors in the regulated industries. 24
The Finance Committee further stated that the intent of the 1971 Revenue
Act was to " . . . permit regulatory agencies to share the benefits of the
credit between investors and customers where appropriate .... "25 Thus, it is
clear that the utilities are to benefit from the investment credit. However, the
statutes and legislative histories do not specifically restrict state commissions
from dividing the benefits of the credit between investors and consumers.
3.

Present Tensions
To further complicate this regulatory dilemma, the Internal Revenue Service
(IRS) has warned that it will completely disallow the companies' credit in
keeping with §46(f) of the code, if regulatory bodies require companies to
flow through investment credit when the companies have in fact elected Option
1 or 2 treatment pursuant to the statute. The House Conference Committee
put it this way:
If after March 31, 1972, a company flows through to income an amount
greater than that permitted under the option applicable to that company, or
its rate base is adjusted by an amount greater than that permitted under
its applicable option, then the company is to lose the investment credit
with respect to its public utility property for all open years and all future
years. 26
If one considers orders handed down by commissions such as the California
Public Utilities Commission, the confrontations between the commissions and
the IRS result, as one writer put it, "in a giant game of 'chicken"'. 27 The
drafters of the statute apparently believed that no regulator would risk exposing
the companies to excessive back taxes which would drain the companies of
needed capital and earnings and eventually justify a need for substantial rate
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

S. Rep. No. 437, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); 1971 U.S. Cong. & Admin. News 1943.
S. Rep. No. 437, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 36 (1971) [emphasis added].
119771 1 Fed. Taxes (P-H) Par. 5926 [emphasis added].
H.R. Rep. No. 708, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 38 (1971).
The Wall Street Journal, Feb. 25, 1977, at 1, col. 6.
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increases. The California commission, as well as other ratemaking bodies, have
decided to take the risk. The IRS showed signs of backing up the statutory
sanctions with action directed at the California commission. In Re Southern
California Gas Company, 28 a case decided at approximately the same time
as Pacific Telephone, the IRS condemned the commission's decision to flow
through the benefits of investment tax credit, in an opinion letter by John
Hatt, chief of the IRS Corporate Tax Division. The commission in this case
had used a "reduction in risk" adjustment to the company's federal income
tax that was tantamount to total flow through of the ITC. The IRS warned:
the CPUC [California Public Utilities Commission] did indirectly and
by another name, what it could not do directly without causing Southern
California to lose the benefits of the investment credit. Congress did not intend
to allow the investment credit in such circumstances.
The conclusion here is simply that the investment tax credit will not be
available for Federal Income Tax purposes when the benefits to be otherwise
derived therefrom are treated for ratemaking purposes in the manner provided
in Decisions No. 85627 (as affirmed by Decision No. 86117).29
Many commissions, then, feel that it is within their jurisdiction to set
utility rates for their states. Since the ITC often has an important impact on
utility rate structures, they feel that they may control accounting methods of
ITC for ratemaking purposes. Again in California, the state Supreme Court
reviewed a decision by the Public Utilities Commission involving accounting
for accelerated depreciation and investment tax credit. 30 In its opinion the
court stated:
The commission has the power to prevent a utility from passing on to the
ratepayers unreasonable costs for materials and services by disallowing
expenditures that the Commission finds unreasonable. The same rule applies
where the utility resorts to accounting practices which result in unreasonably
inflated tax expense . . . . The 1968 method of imputed accelerated depreciation
and flow through is favorable to the ratepayer but harsh on Pacific. . . . The
method adopted by the decision before us [service life flow through], is harsh
on the ratepayer . . . but beneficial to Pacific . . . . The commission is not
compelled to adopt one of the two extremes set forth above but may adopt
a compromise striking a proper balance between the interests
of the ratepayers
and Pacific in light of the federal income tax statutes. 3 1
The court permitted the state ratemaking body in this case to formulate what
it considered to be an equitable approach to the problem. And until an
interpretive federal decision specifies to the contrary, state regulatory agencies
appear free to exercise discretion in dealing with investment tax credit in
accordance with the agency's usual standards in light of the needs of the
regulated industry. And, as discussed supra, despite indications of possible

28.
29.
30.
31.

Re Southern California Gas Company, California Public Utilities Commission, No. 85627 (affirmed
by Decision No. 86117) 1977.
Letter by John Hatt, Chief, Corporate Tax Division, Internal Revenue Service (1977), cited in The
Wall Street Journal, Feb. 25, 1977, at 1, col. 6.
City and County of San Francisco v. Public Util. Com'n, 98 Cal. Rptr. 286, 6 Cal. 3d 119, 490 P.
2d 798 (1971).
City and County of San Francisco v. Public Util. Com'n, 98 Cal. Rptr. 286, 6 Cal. 3d 119, 490 P.
2d 798 (1971). See also: City of Los Angeles v. Public Util. Com'n, 125 Cal. Rptr. 779, 15 Cal. 3d
680, 543 P. 2d 1371 (1975) where the court reaches a similar conclusion.
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action by the IRS, up to the present time the IRS has not disallowed the
credit for any company due to regulatory treatment by state commissions.
Furthermore, the only situation in which the IRS has taken any preliminary
action consists of commission attempts to immediately flow through all the
benefits of the investment credit to the ratepayer. Commission determinations
that have ordered a sharing of these benefits between the companies and
consumers have not been actively opposed by the IRS.
ACCOUNTING ALTERNATIVES
1. Compliance With the Internal Revenue Code
If a state utility commission decides to follow the letter of the code, the
choice of regulatory and accounting alternatives rests solely on the previous
elections of the companies involved. If the utility timely elected Option 1
treatment pursuant to §46(f)(1) of the code, then the state agency may deduct
deferred credit balances from the utility's rate base as long as the rate base
is restored less rapidly than ratably over the useful life of the asset. The
agency is precluded from any additional reduction of the cost of service by
the ITC.
If the utility made a timely election for Option 2 treatment under §46(f)(2),
then the agency may normalize and amortize the credit over the useful life
of the property by credits to cost of service. The state agency may not allow
the rate base to be reduced by any portion of the credit.
If the company elected Option 3 treatment pursuant to §46(f)(3) of the
code, the state commission may account for the investment credit in any
manner it deems applicable. This option would permit immediate flow through
accounting procedures but solely under Option 3. For example, in the Pacific
Telephone case, the company's Option 2 election was disregarded by the
commission, which used flow through accounting. procedures. Pacific Telephone
wants the commission to comply with the code, which would preclude the use
of flow through of the ITC in their case. Thus, for those state regulatory
bodies which follow the letter of the code (unlike the California commission),
the accounting procedures are clearly set out above.
In implementing Option 2 treatment above, there is a special disagreement
between companies that have elected Option 2 treatment and state agencies
which follow the Code and implement the companies' elections. The controversy
centers around differing interpretations as to what constitutes a reduction in
the rate base. §46(0(2) provides that if a taxpayer or company makes an
election for Option 2 treatment, no investment credit shall be allowed for that
company if
• . . the base to which the taxpayer's rate of return for ratemaking purposes
is applied is reduced by any portion32of the credit allowable by §38 (determined
without regard to this subsection).
After providing for the current year's amortization of deferred ITC, a question
remains as to how to treat the remaining unamortized balance. Since the
statute provides that the rate base may not be reduced by any portion of the

32.

I.R.C. §46(f)(2)(B).
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credit, the utilities often request that the deferred ITC be reflected in the
companies' cost of capital at the cost of equity. 33 In the case of most regulatory
bodies, this balance is either not included at all in the capital structure, or it
is treated as a zero-cost item. 34 The companies, however, point to the legislative
history of the Revenue Act of 1971 to show that Congress would disapprove
of this treatment. The Senate committee report stated in part:
In determining whether and to what extent a credit has been used to reduce
the rate base, reference is to be made to any accounting treatment that can
affect the company's permitted profit on investment by treating the credit in
any way other than as though it had been contributed by the company's
common shareholders. For example, if the 'cost of capital' rate assigned to
.the credit is less than that assigned to common shareholders' investment, that
would be treated as, in effect, a rate base adjustment. 35
Many regulatory bodies and courts agree with the utilities that there is evidence
of the intent of Congress to regard zero-cost capital treatment as equivalent
to a rate base reduction. It does not necessarily follow, however, that the
deferred ITC, if included in the capital structure, should be included at the
cost of equity capital as the companies contend. The IRS recently promulgated
Regulation 1.46-5, which speaks directly to this problem. It provides:
1.46-5 (a) (3) Rate Base
, . * assigning a 'cost of capital' rate to the amount of such credit which is
less than the permissible overall rate of return (determined without regard to
the credit) would be treated as, in effect, a rate base adjustment. What is
the overall rate of return depends upon the practice of the regulatory body.
Thus, for example, an overall rate of return may be a rate determined on
the basis of an average or weighted average of allowable rates of return on
investments by common stockholders, preferred stockholders, and creditors. 36
This regulation. clearly rejects the zero-cost capital approach to the deferred
investment credit. It clearly accepts, however, including the deferred balance
in the capital structure at the overall cost of capital. This, of course,. is the
same procedure and has the same result as not including the investment credit
in the capital structure at all.
Table I shows three approaches to the inclusion of the investment credit
in the cost of capital. One can see from Table I that it makes a substanstial
difference which method is used. Method A, the Zero-Cost Capital Method,
yeilds an overall cost of capital of 9.4%, which is the lowest of the three
methods. As previously discussed, however, this method is in direct opposition
to Regulation 1.46-5. Method B, the Cost of Equity Method, yeilds an overall
cost of capital of 10.0%, which is the highest of the three methods and the
one most preferred by the utilities. Method C, the Overall Cost of Capital
Method, yeilds an overall cost of capital of 9.89%. Under this method the
actual cost of the deferred investment credit is calculated without regard to
33. Re Appalachian Power Company, Case No. 8182, testimony of company witness John F. Utley,
received at the West Virginia Public Service Commission, Dec. 5, 1975.
34. Regulatory commissions that have used the latter approach include. the Minnesota Public Service
Commission. 8 P.U.R. 4th 75 (1974); the Arizona Corporation Commission, 8 P.U.R. 4th 547 (1975);
the Massachusetts Department of Public Utilities, 11 P.U.R. 4th 270 (1975) and 11 P.U.R. 4th 297
(1975), and the Maryland Public Service Commission, 10 P.U.R. 4th 211 (1975).
35.
36.

11977] 1 Fed. Taxes (p-H) Par. 5926.
Treasury Reg. 1.46-5, 771 C.C.H. Par. 587 DD [emphasis added].
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the credit as required by the regulation. Therefore, the cost of debt and equity
capital (4.0% + 5.4%) divided by their combined percentage of the total capital
(95%) equals 9.89%, which is equal to the overall cost of capital if the
remaining 5% is also assigned that cost rate. It follows that Method C would
be most advantageous to consumers in thosejurisdictions where cost of capital
37
is directly translated into a proper rate of return on rate base.

TABLE I

INCLUDING THE INVESTMENT TAX CREDIT
IN THE COST OF CAPITAL: THREE APPROACHES
Assume:

Company X with $100,000 capital
$50,000 - debt capital at 8% cost
$45,000 - equity capital at 12% cost
$ 5,000 - investment tax credit
Capitalization

A.

50%
45%
5%
100%

8%
12%
0%
overall cost of capital:

4.0%
5.4%
0%
9.4%

ITC Deferrals at Cost of Equity Method
Debt
Equity
ITC

C.

Weighted Cost of Capital

Zero-Cost Capital Method
Debt
Equity
ITC

B.

Actual Cost

50%
45%
5%
100%

8%
4.0%
12%
5.4%
12%
.6%
overall cost of capitak 10.0%

Overall Cost of Capital Method
Debt
Equity
ITC

50%
45%
5%
100%

8%
4.0%
12%
5.4%
9.89%*
.49%
overall cost of capital: 9.89%

*Calculated "without regard to the credit" as required in Regulation 1.46-5.

37.

The Georgia Public Service Commission has recently addressed this issue in Re Continental Telegraph
Company of the South. The commission refused to permit the company to include investment tax
credit in the capital structure. In its order dated Feb. 1, 1977, the commission stated:
In this regard, the company's witness contended that in enacting the Revenue Act of 1971,
Congress intended that the post-1970 unammortized deferred job development credits be treated
as equity in the capital structure . . .. This Commission has a different interpretation of the
intent of Congress. This Commission believes that it was the intent of Congress to prevent job
development credit from being treated as capital supplied at no cost in the capital structure,
and that if the job development credit were not included in the capital structure, the Commission
would be within the intent of Congress since the credit would be priced at no less than the
overall cost of capital determined without regard to the credit.
Re Continental Telephone Company of the South, 18 P.U.R. 4th 187 (1977).
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2.

Non-Compliance With the Internal Revenue Code
Rather than strict compliance with the elective options of the companies
doing business within the state, an alternative policy for state regulatory bodies
is one that allows the commission not to comply with the code in the interest
of the regulated utility or the consuming public. As stated supra, until an
interpretive federal court decision is handed down or until actual disallowance
of the investment credit is practiced by the IRS, state commissions may
exercise their discretionary ratemaking powers.
TABLE II

ALTERNATE ACCOUNTING PROCEDURES
FOR THE INVESTMENT TAX CREDIT
AS USED BY STATE REGULATORY COMMISSIONS
Company X - Assumptions

Asset Service Life = 20 years
Rate Base
Rate of Return
ITC Earned

= $100,000
= 10%
= $5,000

Federal Income Tax
Utility Rate

=

50%

Depreciation
Operating Expense
Other Taxes
Return on Rate Base
Federal Income Tax
Revenue Paid by
Ratepayer*

CHOICE I
Option I
§46(j)(1)
$ 5,000
5,000
1,000
9,500
9,525

CHOICE II
Option 2
§460l(2)
$ 5,000
5,000
1,000
10,000
9,500

CHOICE III
Total Flow
Through
$ 5,000
5,000
1,000
10,000
-0-

CHOICE IV
Reduction of FIT
and Rate Base
$ 5,000
5,000
1,000
9,525
9,025

$30,025

$30,500

$21,000

$29,550

How FIT is Calculated for Ratemaking Purposes
Actual FIT before
ITC**
ITC for Ratemaking
FIT for Ratemaking

$ 9,750
- 250
S 9,500

$ 9,525
-0$ 9,525

$ 5,000
-5,000
$
-0-

$ 9,275
- 250
$ 9,025

Ratepayer Benefit Scale
Ratio
1.000
1.407
1.429
1.452

Choice
Choice
Choice
Choice

III
IV
I
II

-

Total Flow Through ...............
Reduction of FIT and Rate .........
Rate Base Reduction ...............
Amortization of FIT ...............

$21,000
$29,500
$30,025
$30,500

*Reflects revenue requirements for initial year
"Allowance for return + FIT = Net Taxable Income
Tax before ITC = .50 x Taxable Income

Since the enactment of the ITC in 1962, the state regulatory bodies have
commonly applied four different methods of accounting for the credit. These
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alternatives are shown in Table II. State commissions that decide not to follow
the letter of the code are free to choose any of the methods of, accounting
for the ITC regardless of the company's prior election. Table II presents these
alternatives as they would be applied to a utility company. Choices I and II
in Table II follow the accounting procedures provided by Option 1 (reduction
of rate base) and Option 2 (service life flow through) under §46(f) of the
code. Choice III represents a total flow through treatment of the credit. Choice
IV represents a treatment of the credit which combines the rate base reduction
of Choice I with the amortization provision of Choice II.
Instead of reducing the FIT, Choice I provides for a reduction of the rate
base with ratable restoration over the life of the asset.
Choice II provides for ratemaking treatment of ITC by ratable reduction
of FIT over the service life of the asset. This choice offers the greatest benefit
to the companies since only 1/20 of the ITC is flowed through to the consumer
in any one year. Of course, at the end of the useful life of the asset, the
entire ITC has flowed through to income. This approach has been accepted
38
and applied by various state regulatory bodies.
Choice III represents a total flow through treatment of ITC. This represents
a substantial reduction of the burden on the ratepayer, but retains none of
the credit earned for the utilities.
Choice IV represents a compromise among the other three choices. Under
this normalization method, the ITC is amortized over the useful life of the
asset, as in Choice II. But this ratable allocation is coupled with a deduction
of the remaining unamortized balance from the rate base.
CONCLUSIONS
The foregoing analysis of the accounting procedures for investment tax
credit suggest several conclusions.
First, state regulatory commissions must decide whether to comply with
the accounting procedures outlined in §46(f) of the code with respect to timely
elections by the regulated companies. If a commission decides to so comply,
then the procedures are set out above. 39 The commission may not exercise its
discretion in applying accounting procedures to the investment credit under
§46(f) (1) and (2). And, as discussed supra, only if a company renewed its
election of Option 3 after the 1975 act may the commission use its discretion
in formulating proper accounting procedures. The only important decision would
be the commission's treatment of cost of credit in the capital structure of an
Option 2 company. This analyjsis shows that state commissions may adopt a,
policy of omitting the ITC from the utilities' capital structure. Table I suggests

38.

39.

Re Arkansas Louisiana Gas Company, Docket Nos. U-2338, U-2348, 96 P.U.R. 3d 209 (1972); Re
Virginia Electric and Power Company, West Virginia Public Service Commission, Case No. 7515,
October 22, 1974; Re Accounting Procedure for Investment Tax Credit, Docket No. 9883-PU, Order
No. 4489, Jan. 6, 1969, 78 P.U.R. 3d 167 (1969).
The language of §46(f)(8) is such that even a dispute as to whether an election has been made at
all results in a determination between Option I and Option 2 treatment of the additional 6% credit.
Re Huntington Water Corporation, West Virginia Public Service Commission, Case No. 8666 (1976).
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that such a policy would enable the consumer to escape the additional40 burden
of paying a return to investors on the unamortized balance of ITC.
Second, this analysis shows that, depending upon a commission's policy
objectives, in many situations the commission may be able to treat the investment
credit in a more effective manner by not following the letter of the code.
Until a definitive federal court decision is handed down, commissions are free
to treat the investment credit by any method they deem most applicable to
the particular company and service area involved.
Table II presents the four accounting alternatives most used by state
commissions. Each alternative requires the consuming public to supply different
amounts of capital. Choice I requires the ratepayer to provide $30,025 in
revenues. This choice is less beneficial to the consumer than either Choice III
or IV, but of greater benefit than Choice II. The Ratepayer Benefit Scale in
Table II shows that the capital requirements of Choice I are closest to the
requirements of Choice IV. But since Choice I requires no immediate amortization
of the investment credit, it requires approximately 2.2% more revenue from
the consumer. Under this option the consumer would realize some of the initial
benefit, since with a lower rate base the commission would justifiably find a
lower revenue requirement and thereby lower rates. This -choice is applicable
to situations in which a state agency wishes to, share the benefits of the credit
(in keeping with the legislative history) between the companies and ratepayers
while still allowing the utilities to retain most of the benefit.
Choice II in Table II is the alternative of greatest value to the companies.
In essence, it permits the utility to retain the use of consumer-contributedfunds
(the unamortized balance), and hold these funds as though they are a cost-free
loan. It can reduce the need for companies to borrow money at market interest
rates. Choice II requires 2.3% more revenue than Choice I, 4.5% more revenue
than Choice IV, and a full 45% more revenue than Choice III. Therefore,
this choice is applicable to situations in which a commission wishes to restrict
the credit for the optimum use of the utility.
Choice III in Table II is by far the most advantageous accounting method
from the consumer's standpoint. It requires far less consumer-contributed capital
than the other alternatives. Choice III is applicable for situations in which
the state agency (such as the California commission in Pacific Telephone) believes
that all-of the benefit of the credit should be immediately flowed through to
the ratepayer, leaving no measurable benefit for the companies. It must be
remembered, however, that this accounting method seems to fly in the face

40.

In fact, one study indicates that faced with a common equity return on the unamortized investment
credit balance, consumers are better off to forego the credit entirely. If immediate flow through is
not available, the credit is better avoided altogether. J. Leslie Livingstone, David C. Ewert, Annis D.
Sherali, "Treatment of Investment Tax Credit: A Regulatory Dilemma", (paper) (Mar. 1977). Mr.
Livingstone is a professor of industrial management at Georgia Institute of Technology. Mr. Ewert is
a professor of finance at Georgia State University. Mr. Sherali is project engineer with Southern
Engineering Company, Atlanta, Georgia.
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of congressional intent, and is the sole option likely to incur opposition from
the IRS. Unless the company has renewed its election of Option 3 under
§46(f)(3), immediate flow through could result in complete loss of the investment
credit for the companies.
Choice IV in Table II requires less revenue from the consumer than Choice
I or Choice II. It seems to be a viable alternative for both companies and
consumers for several reasons. First, it comports with the congressional intent
expressed in the legislative histories of the revenue acts. The reports expressed
the desire that the credit be shared between the consumers and companies.
Second, it is a middle ground of reasonable compromise, since it gives the
utility company cost-free use of needed capital without requiring consumers
to pay a return to utility stockholders on consumer contributed funds. It also
provides for a return of contributed funds to the ratepayer through the annual
reduction in federal income tax. Third, there is no evidence that the IRS will
disallow the credit for a utility treated under Choice IV. While the IRS has
initiated some opposition to total flow through, it has not done so where the
state agency has continued to share the benefits of the credit. Thus, Choice
IV would settle the " . . . confrontation between companies and consumers
that may well end up with an extreme outcome either of immediate flow
through or total disallowance by the IRS of the ITC. Neither alternative is
desirable for utility companies who are striving to carry out construction
programs with the benefits of ITC.''41 The purpose of the ITC would be
fulfilled with as little burden as possible on the ratepayer.
Finally, this analysis suggests that each state commission must make its
own decision regarding accounting procedures for the investment credit. The
decision is an important one, for it has a substantial effect on the utility
industry and the American consumer. By understanding these alternatives, state
commissions may make an informed decision as to which accounting procedure
will best implement the policy objectives it seeks to attain.

41.

Livingstone et al., "Treatment of Investment Tax Credit: A Regulatory Dilemma," supra note 40.

